SueDB wrote:
It is about leadership and command/control. When you see a debacle, you can be sure the leadership FAILED somewhere along the line.
The Army relies heavily - extremely heavily - on the mid-grade officers and NCOs. The staff sergeants, sergeants first class, first sergeants, captains, and majors are the core professional cadre for most units. Go much below those ranks, and people are still learning the basics of leadership. Go much above, and they become too few and far removed to have the same impact. That's probably always been the case, but it's particularly true in the modern volunteer force.
Soldiers in those pay grades almost always have more than 4 years in. The typical soldier in the mid-leadership positions probably has more like 8-12 in. It's very rare to see anyone in any of these pay grades who has yet to deploy. Most have probably deployed 2-4 times. And just looking at the number of deployments understates the burden.
As SueDB has pointed out, the Vietnam-era Army relied on individual replacements. The units remained in the combat zone, and individual soldiers rotated through the units on a 12-month cycle. This practice received a great deal of criticism, and was abandoned in favor of the current practice of rotating entire units as a block. That, combined with the deployment tempo, has led to an army where the combat arms soldiers have spent most of the last decade in one of three states: deployed, just back from deployment, or preparing for a deployment. In addition, the Army has undergone quite a bit of restructuring during the current conflicts, with the restructuring being squeezed in between deployments. Preparing for deployment typically involves one or more multi-week training deployments. Meanwhile, the training side of the house has had to restructure training to account for lessons learned, increase training to account for the increase in the size of the military, and do it all without having received a substantial increase in personnel or funding of their own.
In practical terms, what this means is that the mid-level leadership of the army (not to mention a lot of the more senior leadership) has spent most or all of the last 10 years either deployed or working long hours. That's not good for family stress. Many of these same families - including the Bales family - have been very hard hit by the housing downturn. VA loans make it possible for soldiers to buy homes with little money down, while frequent moves can result in families having little choice in when to enter the real estate market. With home prices that are either stable or rising, that hasn't typically been a problem. But a lot of homes lost a lot of value. The income side is a slightly different picture. The active duty member of the family has job security, but the civilian spouses do not. When the Army says move, it's time to move. If the new locale is hurting more economically than the old, and the civilian spouse can not find work, that's the way it is. And even on-base preferential hiring can't do much to offset that if the federal government is shrinking and/or there's a hiring freeze in effect.
Active duty soldiers who have been deployed have a substantially higher risk for various types of mental illness. That's well-known. There has not been anywhere near the volume of research on the rates of mental illness among the families of deployed soldiers, but the research that has been done suggests that there are substantially elevated risks for depression, anxiety, and other conditions. The family stress, in turn, is obviously going to lead to more stress on the soldier. I know divorce rates have taken off. I'm pretty sure substance abuse has, too.
There are a lot of people under a lot of stress. That group includes the majority of the current mid-grade officers and NCOs in the US Army, and the majority of their families.
None of this excuses murder, and I'm not trying to. I'm just trying to explain why a soldier snapping - no matter how obscenely vile the consequences may be - does not surprise me.