Sterngard Friegen wrote:
The nuclear airplane was obsoleted by the satellite. Had there been no satellites, an ultra high flying nuclear airplane would have been invaluable.
JFK killed the nuclear airplane before we or anybody else had a strong satellite program. Sputnik had not yet been launched when work began on the nuclear airplane. This was a plan laid before the first atomic bombs were dropped; Fermi was one of those who thought it would work. It was a period in which nuclear energy was seen as ubiquitous and ridiculously cheap in the near future. (In fact, design work began on a nuclear submarine before Pearl Harbor. Visit Groton, CT, for a tour and more info.)
The aircraft frame that was to be used was the B-36, which had a ceiling of just 39,900 ft.
"Flying on Nuclear, The American Effort to Built a Nuclear Powered Bomber". It was not designed to be a high flying nuclear airplane; it was just an enormous airplane that could stay in the air while other airplanes descended for fuel and lubrication. Unlike in other airplanes, the crew of the nuclear airplane would have been confined to a highly-shielded, very small space:

I don't know whether America is ever again going to be in that kind of war (hope not). Such an airplane may now be irrelevant. In addition to nuclear submarines (also a Connecticut product), we now seem increasingly to depend on Stealth technologies and drones of several kinds, with a satellite system fully in place. The tale of the nuclear airplane is now mostly used to show the hazards of projects that are so secret that even the people who would supposedly use the aircraft don't know the project exists. Even in military work, science conducted in secret loses much of the strength of the scientific method.
Herb York described the decision-making process as absurd.
Quote:
The story of the ANP, it seems to me, provides a classic illustration of some of the forces that drive the arms race onward. It involves partisan politics: Congress was controlled by the Democrats, the White House by the Republicans. It provides a classic example of the exploitation of the fears and anxieties of the public through the use of imaginary "intelligence." It shows how sincere people who badly want to be misled can easily mislead themselves: the so-called intelligence that was used as one of the arguments in support of a crash program by our side was based in part on technical articles which really did appear in the Soviet press about possible uses of atomic energy, including application of nuclear propulsion to aircraft. These articles were strictly theoretical, but it was quite easy for persons who wanted to believe that the Russians were ahead, to believe it with passion. The ANP story shows how an industrial organization, in this case General Electric, does not merely do what the government asks it to do, but rather works very hard through all possible channels to make sure that the government asks it to do what it wants to do in the first place. It shows how military advocates of programs, especially programs involving more than one agency, attempt to take advantage of all the internal rivalries and tensions which exist in order to find a successful path for the accomplishment of what they--very sincerely, to be sure--believe to be essential, and which they therefore believe justifies the use of any tactics to ensure that administrators will not be able "to put the budget ahead of survival."
This was the military-industrial complex about which Eisenhower warned in his Farewell Address. Jerome Wiesner, who had become a founding member of the Board of the MacArthur Foundation, used this story to illustrate how badly off track our international security programs, including academic programs, had gotten. He and Murray Gell-Mann were largely responsible for the Foundation's program that sought (successfully) to upend scholarship on international security, to take it from the hands of the bean counters (physicists) and the watchers of who stood near to whom on the balcony during the Moscow May Day parade (political scientists). That program produced the first academics who were willing to contemplate a world in which the U.S.S.R. had disappeared as a military power; this was heresy to the orthodox analysts, some of whom had supported projects like the nuclear airplane.
The project did leave a lasting mark: the Connecticut plant is still under NIOSH investigation for issues of worker safety. It was quite a project:
Connecticut Aircraft Nuclear Engine Lab - Middletown.
It is probably an absolute certainty that at least one equally foolish project is now underway in some corner of the Pentagon. It was probably underway when the DoD could not afford to provide armor for the Humvees that were blown up by early versions of what may be the "weapon of the 21st century," the sophisticated descendants of last century's IED's.