Defense counsel has just made a devastating error. He introduced into evidence some hearsay statements (subject to an exception) of the defendant in which she was seeking to exonerate herself. Under Florida law (which appears a bit peculiar, but it's the law), when such evidence is introduced by the defendant, her hearsay statement can be impeached by her prior felony convictions.
Here's the Florida case --
Huggins v. State. The trial judge knew of the case intimately, since it was the Florida (hanging chads) Supreme Court affirming a murder conviction after the evidence of 9 prior felonies was admitted by the same trial court judge!
So, it looks as if Casey Anthony's 6 prior felony convictions are coming in.
(One of the reasons why a defendant doesn't take the stand is because usually at that stage felony convictions can come in as impeachment. Now Baez has additional reasons to put her on the stand and insure she gets the death penalty.)
Baez stinks. Anthony may yet have an ineffective assistance of counsel claim after she is convicted and sentenced to death.
Quote:
Huggins also contests the admission of his nine prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes, arguing that the State, rather than defense counsel, elicited the hearsay statement attributed to Huggins and that evidence of Huggins' nine felony convictions should have been excluded under the balancing test of section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2002). The trial court admitted the fact of Huggins' convictions on the basis of section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides in part that "[w]hen a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness." The trial court's ruling was made in accordance with First and Fourth District Court of Appeal holdings that section 90.806 permits the introduction of a defendant's felony convictions when the defendant elicits his or her own exculpatory, hearsay statement through another 756*756 witness at trial. See Kelly v. State, 857 So.2d 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Werley v. State, 814 So.2d 1159 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Llanos v. State, 770 So.2d 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Two of those decisions cite the following treatise passage concerning the functionally identical federal evidence provision: "A defendant who chooses not to testify but who succeeds in getting his or her own exculpatory statements into evidence runs the risk of having those statements impeached by felony convictions." 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 806.04(2)(b) (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.2002). We agree with the First and Fourth Districts on that point of law. Under section 90.806(1), a hearsay declarant is treated as a "witness" and his or her credibility may be attacked in the same manner as any other witness's credibility. In turn, section 90.610(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides in pertinent part that "[a] party may attack the credibility of any witness ... by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year."
889 So.2d 743, 755-756 (2004)