Based upon the language of Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 and the guidance provided by Wong Kim Ark, we conclude that persons born within the borders of the United States are “natural born Citizens” for Article II, Section 1 purposes, regardless of the citizenship of their parents.

The Plaintiffs do not mention the above United States Supreme Court authority in their complaint or brief; they primarily rely instead on an eighteenth century treatise and quotations of Members of Congress made during the nineteenth century. To the extent that these authorities conflict with the United States Supreme Court‟s interpretation of what it means to be a natural born citizen, we believe that the Plaintiffs‟ arguments fall under the category of “conclusory, non-factual assertions or legal conclusions” that we need not accept as true when reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Irish, 864 N.E.2d at 1120. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it dismissed the Plaintiffs‟ case.

I haven't finished reading this opinion yet, but so far this appears to be significant. It may be the highest court anywhere to have chosen to directly address the merits of the birther movement. (In order to soundly reject them.)

The bases of the Plaintiffs‟ arguments come from such sources as FactCheck.org, The Rocky Mountain News, an eighteenth century treatise by Emmerich de Vattel titled “The Law of Nations,” and various citations to nineteenth century congressional debate.11 For the reasons stated below, we hold that the Plaintiffs‟ arguments fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and that therefore the trial court did not err in dismissing the Plaintiffs‟ complaint.

Does any appeal against this decision go directly to the Supreme Court?
Regards ..........Dick

Does any appeal against this decision go directly to the Supreme Court?
Regards ..........Dick

. . .The Indiana Supreme Court is the highest court of the state. It has the duty not only to decide appeals but also to supervise the state’s whole judicial branch. The Court of Appeals is the intermediate (an in-between) appellate court that usually decides the appeal from the trial courts first.

Does any appeal against this decision go directly to the Supreme Court?
Regards ..........Dick

The Indiana Court of Appeals today confirmed a common saying in the legal community that bad cases make bad law.

There's a reason other courts failed to reach a conclusion Judge Brown reached in this opinion. It is based upon the long-held rule of constitutional interpretation that a court should refrain from deciding a case on constitutional grounds when the case can be disposed of on other non-constitutional grounds. Procedurally, this case had to be dismissed because the plaintiffs sued the wrong defendant and lacked standing to sue. There was no reason for the court to decide a constitutional question as it did in this case, and that's what makes it so disturbing.

Not everyone is as happy as us -

Advance Indiana - Bad Cases Make Bad Law

“Thus, while we do not test the sufficiency of the facts alleged with regards to their adequacy to provide recovery, we do test their sufficiency with regards to whether or not they have stated some factual scenario in which a legally actionable injury has occurred.” Trail v. Boys and Girls Clubs of Northwest Indiana, 845 N.E.2d 130, 134 (Ind. 2006).

This fundamental principle, with these qualifications or explanations of it, was clearly, though quaintly, stated in the leading case known as „Calvin‟s Case,‟ or the „Case of the Postnati,‟ decided in 1608, after a hearing in the exchequer chamber before the lord chancellor and all the judges of England, and reported by Lord Coke and by Lord Ellesmere. Calvin's Case, 7 Coke, 1, 4b-6a, 18a, 18b; Ellesmere, Postnati, 62-64; s. c. 2 How. St. Tr. 559, 607, 613-617, 639, 640, 659, 679. The English authorities ever since are to the like effect. Co. Litt. 8a, 128b; Lord Hale, in Harg. Law Tracts, 210, and in 1 Hale, P. C. 61, 62; 1 Bl. Comm. 366, 369, 370, 374; 4 Bl. Comm. 74, 92; Lord Kenyon, in Doe v. Jones, 4 Term R. 300, 308; Cockb. Nat. 7; Dicey, Confl. Laws, pp. 173-177, 741.

The fundamental principle of the common law with regard to English nationality was birth within the allegiance-also called „ligealty,‟ „obedience,‟ „faith,‟ or „power‟-of the king. The principle embraced all persons born within the king‟s allegiance, and subject to his protection. Such allegiance and protection were mutual,-as expressed in the maxim, „Protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjectio protectionem,‟-and were not restricted to natural-born subjects and naturalized subjects, or to those who had taken an oath of allegiance; but were predicable of aliens in amity, so long as they were within the kingdom. [highlight]Children, born in England, of such aliens, were therefore natural-born subjects.[/highlight] But the children, born within the realm, of foreign ambassadors, or the children of alien enemies, born during and within their hostile occupation of part of the king‟s dominions, were not natural-born subjects, because not born within the allegiance, the obedience, or the power, or, as would be said at this day, within the jurisdiction, of the king.

The English authorities ever since are to the like effect. Co. Litt. 8a, 128b; Lord Hale, in Harg. Law Tracts, 210, and in 1 Hale, P. C. 61, 62; 1 Bl. Comm. 366, 369, 370, 374; 4 Bl. Comm. 74, 92; Lord Kenyon, in Doe v. Jones, 4 Term R. 300, 308; Cockb. Nat. 7; Dicey, Confl. Laws, pp. 173-177, 741.

Lord Chief Justice Cockburn . . . said: „[highlight]By the common law of England, every person born within the dominions of the crown, no matter whether of English or of foreign parents, and, in the latter case, whether the parents were settled, or merely temporarily sojourning, in the country, was an English subject,[/highlight] save only the children of foreign ambassadors (who were excepted because their fathers carried their own nationality with them), or a child born to a foreigner during the hostile occupation of any part of the territories of England. No effect appears to have been given to descent as a source of nationality.‟ Cockb. Nat. 7.

Well, he has a point... The Court may have been able to avoid ruling on the Constitutionality issue and just tell Ankeny to go away. Although the Court explains that in order to rule on the motion to dismiss, they need to look at the arguments by the plaintiffs. The review of the dismissal is 'de novo' (FRCP 12(b)(6))



The Court is well aware of the issues.

Not everyone is as happy as us -

Advance Indiana - Bad Cases Make Bad Law

This is a decision of the appellate court of the State of Indiana. If the Plaintiffs appeal, it would go up to the Indiana Supreme Court. It is not binding on any other states nor the federal courts. This opinion is, however, well reasoned and any other court (state or federal) is likely to come to exactly the same conclusion.

I think this case is huge. It is the only appellate court in America to have addressed the birther merits head on.

And it's marked for publication!

Which is because the Indiana Court of Appeals very clearly and plainly is trying to send a message with this opinion. The analysis it engaged in was completely unnecessary. It dove into the issue on purpose, of its own accord.

Also, I assume the Indiana Supreme Court has discretionary review powers as most states' high courts do. This means it will only review the case if it chooses to do so. It is extremely unlikely it would choose to review a case of this nature. Upon the Indiana Supreme Court's refusal to review, the plaintiffs could then file a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court will, of course, deny such a petition if filed. Bottom line: this opinion is probably the end of the road and the last word.

I think this case is huge. It is the only appellate court in America to have addressed the birther merits head on.

Also, I assume the Indiana Supreme Court has discretionary review powers as most states' high courts do. This means it will only review the case if it chooses to do so. It is extremely unlikely it would choose to review a case of this nature. Upon the Indiana Supreme Court's refusal to review, the plaintiffs could then file a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court will, of course, deny such a petition if filed. Bottom line: this opinion is probably the end of the road and the last word.

I think this case is huge. It is the only appellate court in America to have addressed the birther merits head on.