Piffle wrote:
Just as I hope that the Georgia Alabama court will throw Orly out at the door on Monday for not being a licensed attorney in Georgia, I hope this Court will nip this in the bud. Because the relator in a quo warranto action represents, in part, the United States, I've long maintained that a non-attorney (including, of course, a disbarred attorney) cannot act as a relator pro se. Judge Lamberth ignored this aspect in handling Orly's quo warranto debacle (but then again, the government never moved for her disqualification either).
The Ninth Circuit agrees.
Stoner v. Santa Clara County Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007) (in a qui tam context). So, as far as I know, does every other Circuit Court of Appeals that has addressed the issue.
Stoner cites the Second, Seventh and Eighth. The Eleventh appears to have followed suit.
I don't see why the analysis would be any different in a federal quo warranto proceeding, which like the False Claim Act (allowing federal qui tam), is also statutory in nature. The analysis seems to be that a relator never has a stand-alone cause of action personal to herself that can be separated from the origin of the relator's standing (the nominal plaintiff), and that a non-attorney cannot represent the interests of another. Makes sense to me.
I'm not entirely sure this is consistent with the common law origin of quo warranto, but it doesn't have to be. The statute clearly abrogated any contradictory common law authority. I'd be surprised if there were any such authority, though. Qui tam is short for
qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means who pursues this action on our Lord the King's behalf as well as his own. "[O]n our Lord the King's behalf" clearly indicates representation of the interests of another.